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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GREG CHILD, 
Petitioner/Appellee. 
RENEE GLOBIS, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
Appeal No.:l20090486 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) and UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-4l03(2)(h) provide this Court 
with jurisdiction over this appeal resulting from the Order \Re: Petition To Modify Order 
filed on April 27, 2009 (the 'Order"), entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court, in 
and for Grand County, with the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court err in finding \that a substantial change of 
circumstances had occurred after the August 2007 judgment, thus 
resulting in the April 27, 2009 Orders 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Utah law makes | clear that a determination of 
whether substantial and material changes have occurred is a fact-intensive legal 
determination that is presumed valid and is reviewed fori abuse of discretion." Doyle v. 
Dovle, 2009 UT App 306,1J15, 221 P.3d 888; see, Young| v. Young, 2009 UT App 3, ^|4, 
201 P.3d 301, cert denied, 211 P.3d 986 (Utah 2009), Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 
47, IflO, 997 P.2d 903, and Moon v. Mooa 1999 UT App 12, 1J28, 973 P.2d 431, cert 
denied, 982 P.2d 89 (Utah 1999). 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court err in finding that it was in the best interest of 
Ariann to modify the custody arrangement to sole legal custody 
vested with Child? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A trial court's factual findings underlying. . .a 
determination of the children's best interests [in a modification based on material change 
of circumstances] may not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous." Hudema v. Carpenter, 
1999 UT App 290, f21, 989 P.2d 491, citing Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 (Utah App. 
1995). "A court's legal conclusion as to whether a material change in circumstances has 
occurred that would warrant reconsidering [a prior custody order] is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion." Id. "A trial judge's award of custody ... is also reviewed for abuse 
of discretion." Id. 
ISSUE III: Is the issue of attorneys' fees from the original custody order 
adequately before this Court in this appeal from modification 
proceedings when the trial court already addressed that issue during 
that time and no appeal was taken from that order; and is Appellant 
entitled to attorneys fees in this action since she is acting pro se, has 
not sufficiently briefed the issue on appeal and failed to preserve the 
issue below? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[A]n appellate court plays a iimited role' in reviewing a 
district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs, and deference is given to a district 
court's judgment on the matter, since the court is in a better position to assess the course 
of litigation and quality." Harris Mkt. Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Communications, 
Inc., 948 F.2d 1518, 1527 (10th Cir.1991). See Gamble, Simmons & Co. v. Kerr-McGee 
2 
Corp., 175 F.3d 762 (C.A.10 (Okla.) 1999). When a notice ok appeal concerning an issue 
is untimely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of it. See, e.g., Serrato v. 
Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,1f 7, 13 P.3d 616. "We have consistently declined 
to review issues that are not adequately briefed." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n (In re 
Questar Gas Co.), 2007 UT 79, ^ 40, 175 P.3d 545. When jin appellant fails to preserve 
an issue below and does not argue that plain error or exceptional circumstances exist to 
justify review of an issue, this Court has declined to consider it on appeal. State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. 5 (Utah 1995). 
ISSUE IV: Does Appellant's failure to follow the proper briefing requirements 
contained in UT. R. APP. P. 24 constitute either grounds for 
dismissal of this appeal or assumption of the correctness and 
affirmation of the judgment below? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "When considering arguments on appeal, we look 
to the requirements of Rule 24 to determine whether an appellant adequately briefed the 
issue." State v. Lucero 2002 UT App 135 |^9 47 P.3d 107. "If a party fails to make a 
concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in the record where those facts are 
supported, the court will assume the correctness of the judgment below." Fackrell v. 
Fackrell 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987); Trees v. Lewis. 738 P.2d 612, 612-13 (Utah 
1987). See also White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Pub. Serv Comm'n, 700 P.2d 1088, 1089 
n. 1 (Utah 1985); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982); Koulis v. Standard 
Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. U T . R . CIV. P. 7(f)(1) 
B. UT. R. CIV. P. 7(f)(2) 
C. UT. R. CIV. P. 52(a) 
D. UT. R. CIV. P. 106(b)(1)(B) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS1 
Greg Child ("Child") and Renee Globis ("Globis") are the parents of Ariann 
Lucinda Child ("Ariann") born August 9, 2004. Child and Globis were never married. 
R0003 at p. 1. On January 20, 2005 Child filed a Verified Petition for Paternity, Custody 
and Related Matters. R0003. On October 30, 2007 the juvenile court entered its Order 
Re: Verified Petition for Paternity, Custody and Related Matters (the "Order"). R0134. 
The Order gave Child and Globis joint legal custody of Ariann, with Globis maintaining 
primary physical custody. Id. at pp. 1-2. Parent time was to be continued as the parties 
had done in the past, with Child having extended parent time with Ariann if he was to be 
out of town. Id. at p. 2. Globis was to have the final say in matters related to the joint 
legal custody of Ariann, with Child being able to turn to the court for resolution. Id. 
The court ordered that neither party was to make disparaging remarks about the 
other, and parent time exchange was to be as peaceful as possible. Id. at p. 4. Child was 
to maintain health insurance on Ariann with one-half of the premium to be deducted from 
his monthly child support, and both parties were to pay one-half of out of pocket costs, 
deductibles, co-pays, etc., with each party paying one-half of daycare costs and a 
1
 These sections of the brief have been combined based on the fact that the transcripts of the proceedings below were 
not provided in accordance with UT. R. APP. P. 11 by Appellant herein, which transcripts would contain the more 
precise "facts" of this matter. While counsel herein typically sets forth information taken from the pleadings in this 
matter under the "Statement of the Case" section of a brief, doing so would leave no further information to be 
included in a "Statement of the Facts" section absent a transcript. Hence, the two sections have been combined 
herein. 
4 
preference given to Child to allow him to care for Ariann if hb was available. Id. at pp. 4-
6. Globis was ordered to pay $5,100.00 to Child as repayment for the loan he had given 
her, and Globis was awarded the tax deduction of Ariann with Child being able to claim 
such deduction if he paid Globis the difference towards! her taxes for taking such 
deduction. Id. at p. 6. 
The Court concluded that, in the event of any relocation, UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-
37 would apply. Ariann was authorized to begin traveling jo Australia with Child at the 
age of three and a half (3.5) years, and internationally at the age of five (5). Id. at p. 7. 
On February 29, 2008 Child filed a Petition to Modify Custody ("Petition to 
Modify") based on the fact Globis had decided to relocate jo Salt Lake City. R0156. In 
the Petition to Modify, Child argued that a substantial ihange in circumstances had 
occurred because Globis was moving to Salt Lake City, hadj 
the entry of the Order, and could not afford rent. R0157. 
not had an adequate job since 
She had dissipated her assets, 
leaving her with no means of supporting Ariann, had been evicted from her home, had no 
unable to care for Ariann or 
egal custody was no longer 
financial means of obtaining adequate housing, and was 
provide her with necessities and support. Id. Joint 
appropriate due to the distance between the parties, and Child was requesting he be 
awarded sole custody with reasonable visitation to Globus and child support computed 
according to statute. R0157-158. 
On April 1, 2008 a hearing was held to address thtfse issues. At such hearing the 
court ordered (temporarily) "the visitation be modified to jhat of the statutory schedule of 
parents who are separated a distance of more than 100 miles." Child was to pay for the 
travel expenses. R0173. On July 10, 2008, during the bench trial on the Petition to 
Modify, Child and Globis negotiated an agreement for visitation. R0238. The language 
of the proposed Order was disputed and a formal Order was never signed by the trial 
court. 
On October 6, 2008, Child filed his Motion to Set Aside Agreement of 7/11/2008, 
Request for Trial Setting and Request for Hearing on Temporary Orders ("Motion to Set 
Aside"). R0252. In his Motion to Set Aside, Child argued that the information presented 
to the trial court by Globis at the July 10, 2008, bench trial regarding employment, living 
arrangements, and daycare was not entirely truthful, and requested such agreement 
reached by the parties at such hearing be set aside. R0254. Child supported such 
Motion to Set Aside by affidavit, in which he indicated that, at the April 1, 2008, hearing, 
Globis had given the court an inaccurate residential address. R0258. He indicated that, 
at the July 10, 2008, hearing, after making agreements with Globis, she refused to come 
to a conclusion as to the wording that should be used in the Order finalizing their 
agreement, and would withhold parent time unless Child gave her money for living 
expenses. R0259-260. It was finally learned through discussions between the parties and 
Globis' counsel that much of the information she had given the court regarding her living 
arrangement, employment, and daycare arrangements was incorrect and untrue. R0260. 
On November 18, 2008, a hearing was held in which Child asked the court to 
reconsider the July temporary7 order because such order was based upon false information 
provided by Globis. R0292. Child was then ordered to pay child support in the amount 
of $351 a month, and each parent was temporarily ordered to provide transportation of 
6 
Ariann one way for parent time. Id. at pp. 1-2. Child was flowed to continue making 
deductions from child support for health insurance prenjiiums. Child was to have 
visitation with Ariann every third week of the month, and th(e matter was set for trial on 
February 20, 2009. Id. at p. 2. 
On February 20, 2009, a trial was held on the merit^. R0322. Both parties and 
numerous witnesses testified. The Court asked both parties to submit written arguments. 
Id. at p. 2. Globis had once again misrepresented material f^cts and Child filed a motion 
on March 13, 2009, to re-open the proceeding pursuant to ru^es 59 and 60(b). R0377. 
On April 7, 2009, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision (the "Decision") 
encompassing the ruling of the court on the merits and on (the motions. R0472. In the 
Decision, the trial court discussed the history of this matter,) including the fact that Child 
either had custody or cared for Ariann approximately forty percent (40%) of the time, 
that Globis was a failure at managing money, had squandered her inheritance of almost 
$150,000, owed several people money in relation to housing, was an unreliable witness, 
and that the court was not optimistic that she would ever b^ able to focus and hold down 
a job to provide a stable and secure home for Ariann. R047J2-474. 
In the Decision, the trial court indicated that Chjild was able to manage his 
finances even though his income was irregular. R0474. The trial court believed he could 
provide a secure and stable home for Ariann, but believed Child's weakness was whether 
he had the emotional flexibility for raising a five (5) year 
had also been much more critical of Globis than the tria 
old child. R0474-475. Child 
court considered reasonable. 
R0475. 
In the Decision, the trial court indicated that both parents had been heavily 
involved in Ariann's life and that her interests were best served by having ongoing 
involvement with both parents. R0476-477, R0482. The trial court considered numerous 
factors in determining custody and parent time including: past conduct and demonstrated 
moral standards of each parent; which parent will act in the child's best interests; bonding 
between parent and child; and maturity of parents. R0481. The trial court believed that 
Child was better situated to provide for Ariann and accordingly awarded custody to 
Child. R0182. 
Globis filed a Notice of Appeal on May 27, 2009. R0571. On or about June 10, 
2009, Globis contacted the court appointed transcriber by letter and requested a copy of 
the transcripts from this matter. R0576. Globis also contacted the transcriber to discuss 
making payments over a period of time. The Court transcriber denied the payment plan 
proposed by Globis, and Globis did not obtain certified transcripts in this matter. 
On December 4, 2009, Globis filed a Motion for Use of Uncertified Transcripts, 
which Child opposed and which was denied by this Court. On January 19, 2010, Globis 
submitted her Brief of Appellant to this Court. However, the Brief did not adhere to UT. 
R. APR R 27. Thus, Globis filed an amended brief and a Motion for Acceptance of 
Appellant's Amended Brief under UT. R. APR P. 22(b)(4)(A)(B)(C)(D)y (b)(5)(B)(C)(D) 
("Motion for Acceptance") with this Court on February 8, 2010, and indicated that she 
was filing an amended brief to comply with UT. R. APR P. 24 and 27. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must first 
8 
show that a substantial material change of circumstances has| occurred since the entry of 
the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Nelscjn v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 
254, 112, 97 P.3d 722, citing Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, f l l , 997 P.2d 903 
(quotations, citations and emphasis omitted). In Huderqa v. Carpenter, this Court 
discussed the modification of child custody orders as follows \ 
Before modifying a custody order, the court conducts a bifurcated inquiry 
to determine, first, if there has been a substantial and material change in the 
circumstances upon which the award was based, and, if so, whether a 
modification is in the best interests of the child. See UTAH CODE ANN. §30-
3-10.4 (1998); Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1989); Sigg v. 
Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 & n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1995) The required finding 
of changed circumstances promotes the policies of preserving stability in 
the child's relationships and preventing the burden on the parties and courts 
of successive adjudications. See Elmer, 776 P.2d at 602. Consequently, the 
court generally may not consider evidence of the child's best interests until 
it finds changed circumstances. See Wright v. Wright] 941 P.2d 646, 650-51 
(Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
Ibid., 1999 UT App 290, 1J22, 989 P.2d 491. In Moodi v. Moody it states, "[T]he 
nonfunctioning of a joint custody arrangement is deafly a substantial change in 
circumstances which justifies reopening the custody issue." \fbid. 715 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 
1985). 
In the instant matter, a substantial change in circumstances has occurred and the 
trial court awarded sole custody of Ariann to Child. Glo|)is moved from Moab to Salt 
Lake City, which caused the joint custody arrangement l[he parties had been using to 
become nonfunctioning. Globis could not obtain stable employment or housing and was 
bouncing around from house to house, thus, not providing a stable environment for 
Ariann or providing for her best interests. Since the circumstances had changed, the trial 
9 
court was correct in awarding custody to Child. 
Under Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1215 (Utah 1996)5 the Utah Supreme 
Court set forth several factors to be considered with respect to a best interests 
determination on a modification of a custody order. These factors included bonding 
between the child and the parents, the ability of the parents to financially support the 
child, the possibility of continuity of the prior custody order, and other matters. 
However, this Court noted that, "[w]hen maintaining one parent's primary physical 
custody will not truly preserve stability and continuity in the child's life, the court may 
find less compelling circumstance are sufficient to modify the custody order." Hudema 
v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ^|26, 989 P.2d 491. The trial court appropriately 
determined that the presumption for continuity of placement was adequately rebutted by 
Globis' lack of stability in employment and housing, together with her determination to 
relocate her and Ariann to Salt Lake City without any adequate plan for an 
ability to viably support the two of them. Child's bond with Ariann, continuing financial 
support, and stability in employment and housing all supported a finding that her best 
interests were more appropriately dealt with in a modification from joint custody to sole 
custody with Child. 
"In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and 
not brought or asserted in good faith...." In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, 
^|45, 86 P.3d 712. In this matter, Globis has requested attorney's fees and costs for the 
separate and distinct proceedings dealing with the initial paternity petition not properly 
10 
before this Court, in addition to attorneys fees surrounding this appeal from the new 
modification proceedings. Not only did the trial court adequately address the issue in the 
paternity action by ordering that the parties pay their own attorneys' fees and costs, but 
she is significantly outside the time for requesting such fees from that separate action. 
Additionally, she has not adequately briefed her request for these modification 
proceedings, and failed to preserve the issue in the trial court below. 
UT. R. APP P. 24(a) mandates that all briefs shall contain the following pertinent 
parts: 
(a)(4) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and (a) 
(5) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court or a statement of grounds for seeking review of ^n issue not preserved 
in the trial court. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain j the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in! the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of thb record relied on. A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal a^ l record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to Recover attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly ^nd set forth the legal 
basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
In the instant matter, Globis has failed to meet the Requirements for briefs as set 
forth in UT. R. APP P. 24(a). More specifically, (1) the issu^ section of her brief does not 
have the appropriate standard of review or authority, (2} her issues are inadequately 
briefed in the argument portion of her brief and are unsupported by any citation to 
relevant authority, and (3) her conclusion is not short, precise, or concise but instead 
11 
appears to be what should likely have been included in the argument section of her brief 
Thus, as Globis' brief is not in conformance with UT. R. APP P. 24(a) and her appeal 
should either be dismissed or this Court should presume the correctness of the judgment 
below and affirm the trial court's Decision at issue herein. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT A 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES HAD 
OCCURRED. 
"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must first 
show that a substantial material change of circumstances has occurred since the entry of 
the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 
254, %2, 97 P.3d 722, citing Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, 111, 997 P.2d 903 
(quotations, citations and emphasis omitted). In its analysis of change of custody and 
child support, this Court has determined the following: 
[T]he court must determine first whether there is sufficient evidence of a 
substantial change in circumstances to justify relitigation of the custody 
question and, then, the trial court must consider the changes in 
circumstances along with all other evidence relevant to the welfare or best 
interests of the child and modify, or refuse to modify, the decree 
accordingly [.] 
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982). "[T]he party seeking modification must 
demonstrate (1) that since the time of the previous decree, there have been changes in the 
circumstances upon which the previous award was based; and (2) that those changes are 
sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the question of custody." Id. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-10.4 addresses the modification of court orders with regards to 
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child custody as follows: 
The court may, after a hearing, modify an order that established custody if 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both oflthe custodians have 
materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be 
modified; and (b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the order 
would be an improvement for and in the best interest of the child. . . 
(emphasis added.) 
In Hudema v. Carpenter, this Court discussed the modification of child custody 
orders as follows: 
Before modifying a custody order, the court conductsl a bifurcated inquiry 
to determine, first, if there has been a substantial and nfiaterial change in the 
circumstances upon which the award was based, ailid, if so, whether a 
modification is in the best interests of the child. See UTAH CODE ANN. §30-
3-10.4 (1998); Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1989); Sigg v. 
Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 & n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1995). |The required finding 
of changed circumstances promotes the policies of preserving stability in 
the child's relationships and preventing the burden on me parties and courts 
of successive adjudications. See Elmer, 776 P.2d at 602. Consequently, the 
court generally may not consider evidence of the child's best interests until 
it finds changed circumstances. See Wright v. Wright, j)41 P.2d 646, 650-51 
(Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
Ibid, 1999 UT App 290, «f22, 989 P.2d 491. In Moody v. Moody it states, "[T]he 
nonfunctioning of a joint custody arrangement is clearly a substantial change in 
circumstances which justifies reopening the custody issue." Ibid. 715 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 
1985). 
In Doyle v. Doyle, this Court indicated that this 
determination that is presumed valid and is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Ibid., 2009 
UT App 306,1J15, 221 P.3d 888. This Court further noted as follows: 
issue is "a fact-intensive 
Also, in making such a determination, trial courts 
guiding principles: (1) the inquiry must 'ordinarily 
the parenting ability of the custodial parent and 
must be mindful of two 
focus exclusively on 
functioning of the the 
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established custodial relationship," Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 626 
(Utah 1987); and (2) the changed circumstances allegedly justifying the 
modification must be material, that is, they must 'be the kind of 
circumstances on which [the] earlier custody decision was based," Becker 
[v. Becker], 694 P.2d [608,] 610 [(Utah 1984)]. 
Id. 
In the current case, the original custody arrangement was based in large part on the 
fact that both parents resided in Moab. "The parties [were] living approximately 20 to 30 
miles apart and the geographical proximity of the homes [was] adequate for joint 
custody." R0126. Since that hearing, however, Globis moved with Ariann to Salt Lake 
City, creating approximately 250 miles in one-way distance between them and Child. As 
the trial court stated, "[t]hough this primarily affects the relationship between Ariann and 
Father, this change does reflect that Mother has substantially less regard for that 
relationship than the court originally expected." R0479. This distance made it impossible 
to enforce and maintain the custody and visitation arrangements that were in place and 
caused them to become nonfunctioning. Moody at 509. 
Globis' stability pertaining to employment and housing significantly changed 
since the original custody arrangement. Globis' employment and housing in 2007 was 
stable and heavily considered at that time when she was awarded primary physical 
custody in the joint legal custody arrangement. However, since the original custody 
arrangement, Globis "has moved Ariann from home to home in the Salt Lake area, 
without having a realistic plan to pay for the selected housing." R0479. "She 
consistently selects housing far above what her income would support, even when she is 
employed." R0474. Since the original custody order was entered, Globis "has not 
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managed to hold a job for more than two months at a time." R0474. Since moving from 
Moab, Globis has moved from job to job, ". . . without establishing herself as a desirable 
employee for any of her employers. The court believe[d] it ip unlikely that [Globis] will 
be able to find a viable niche for herself in the Salt Lake Citjf area which will match her 
talents to a prospective employer's needs and provide for tne life style she apparently 
considers necessary." R0479. "From watching her testify, tne court recognizes that she 
is scattered and unfocused. The court is not optimistic th^t she will ever be able to 
muster the focus necessary to hold down a job and provide a stable, secure home for 
Ariann." R0474. She has been unable to maintain a job and provide stable living 
arrangements for her and Ariann. "[T]he court is persuaded that the circumstances 
affecting [Globis'] role as primary physical custodian of Ariann are so different from 
what the court believed to be true at the time of the original tijial, that a change in custody 
must be considered." R0480. 
The trial court also considered the following factors in deciding to modify custody 
and what was in the best interest of Ariann: 
1. Past Conduct and Demonstrated Moral Standards df Each Parent. "There is no 
appreciable difference in the moral standards of Mother and Father. However, 
Mother and somewhat less 
R0481. 
Father has been more financially responsible than 
vindictive in dealing with those who oppose him.' 
2. Which Parent Will Act in the Child's Best Interests. "[T]he court believes 
Father is more likely to provide for the food, shelter, clothing, and education of 
Ariann in a responsible way. He is also somewhat more likely to promote 
frequent and continuing contact with the other parept." Id. 
3. Bonding Between Parent and Child. "Though littl^ evidence was presented on 
the bond between Ariann and each parent, the c<burt believes that she has a 
strong bond with Mother, simply because she has recently spent substantially 
more time with Mother. However, the relationship between Ariann and Father 
is healthy and good." Id. 
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4. Maturity of Parents. "Father is more emotionally mature than Mother. 
However, both parents show signs of immaturity." Id. 
Having taken these factors into consideration, the trial court noted as follows: 
In view of all of those factors, the court believes Father is best able to 
provide the necessities of life for Ariann and help her grow into a healthy 
adult. The court accordingly awards custody to Father. However, the court 
emphasizes that Ariann especially needs the influence of both parents in her 
life because of the severe and complimentary strengths and weakness of 
Mother and Father. It is therefore essential that Mother have liberal parent 
time with Ariann. 
R0482. Because a parenting plan was not submitted by either parent, and the relationship 
between the parties has been filled with conflict, joint legal custody was not approved. 
Id. The parties were encouraged to negotiate a liberal parent-time schedule, and if they 
fail to agree, then the statutory schedule was to be imposed. Id. The court was correct in 
granting sole physical and legal custody to the father based on the facts and considering 
the numerous other factors. 
Although, no parenting plan was presented as Globis raises in her brief, {see Brief 
of Appellant at p. 19) it does not appear one is required. UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-10.8, 
states as follows: 
(1) In any proceeding under this chapter, including actions for paternity, 
any party requesting joint custody, joint legal or physical custody, or any 
other type of shared parenting arrangement, shall file and serve a proposed 
parenting plan at the time of the filing of their original petition or at the 
time of filing their answer or counterclaim. (2) In proceedings for a 
modification of custody provisions or modification of a parenting plan, a 
proposed parenting plan shall be filed and served with the petition to 
modify, or the answer or counterclaim to the petition to modify. 
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al custody as was at issue 
Hence, a parenting plan was not requisite under the petition 
arrangements contained in This statute, however, only governs a modification of custody 
a parenting plan2, not a modification from joint to sole lege 
herein, which is separately governed by the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-10.4. 
filed by Child herein for a 
modification of the custody order from joint legal custody to s0le legal custody. 
Globis also raises the issue of an unfiled and incomplete petition for paternity that 
Child's prior attorney was in the process of completing wheh the attorney unexpectedly 
passed away. Hand written additions had been added to such petition and Globis' 
attorney at the time of trial attempted to show that Child hqd made the additions. See 
Appellant's Brief at p. 34. It appears that by this allegation, Globis is attempting to attack 
s the trier of fact in a bench Child's credibility. In Pitt v. Taron this Court stated that, "[a] 
trial, the trial court 'is in the best position to' weigh conflicting evidence and the 
credibility of witnesses. Ibid., 2009 UT App 113, ^|2, 210 P.3d 962, citing Homer v. 
Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah Ct.App.1993). In D'Aston y. Aston, this Court further 
states as follows: 
Credibility determinations are within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Riche v. Riche, 784 P[2d 465, 467 (Utah 
App. 1989). "Because the trial court alone can asses^ the demeanor and 
relative credibility of the witnesses [and] is charged jvith the fact finding 
function ... we accord its actions broad deference." Jpckman v. Jackman, 
696 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Utah 1985). 
2
 UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-10.8 is titled "Parenting Plan—Filing—Modifications." 
3
 In fact, UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-10.4(4) specifically states tljat a parenting plan is only 
required when altering custody from a sole legal custody arrangement to a joint legal 
custody arrangement. 
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Ibid, 844 P.2d 345, 355, (Utah App.,1992.) It is inappropriate for Globis to be 
challenging the trial court's determination of Child's credibility below. The trial court is 
the best position to decide his credibility and deference is given to them. Taron at TJ2, and 
Aston at 355. Globis never challenged the petition for paternity, and Child was awarded 
custody, so it appears this issue is moot and does not require review by this Court. 
Globis also argues in her Brief of Appellant that "[t]he potential move from Moab 
by Renee was contemplated early in these parties' relationship and, thus, was 
acknowledged in the findings and the Order." Brief of Appellant pp. 34-35. Globis 
makes this argument in an attempt to show that no substantial change in circumstances 
occurred. However, she is mistaken in this argument. With regards to any potential 
move, the findings and Order states, "fijn the event that either party relocates, U.C.A. 
§30-3-37 shall apply." (Emphasis added). UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-37 as amended by the 
Utah Legislature in 2010 reads as follows: 
(l)For purposes of this section, "relocation" means moving from the state 
or 150 miles or more from the residence specified in the couifs decree. 
(2) The relocating parent shall provide, if possible, 60 days advance written 
notice of the intended relocation to the other parent. The written notice 
of relocation shall contain statements affirming the following: 
(a) the parent-time provisions in Subsection (5) or a schedule approved 
by both parties will be followed; and 
(b) neither parent will interfere with the other's parental rights pursuant 
to court ordered parent-time arrangements, or the schedule approved 
by both parties. 
(3) The court may, upon motion of any party or upon the court's own 
motion, schedule a hearing with notice to review the notice of relocation 
and parent-time schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 and make 
appropriate orders regarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time 
transportation. 
(4) In determining the parent-time schedule and allocating the 
transportation costs, the court shall consider: 
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(a) the reason for the parent's relocation; 
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both parents }n exercising parent-
time; 
(c) the economic resources of both parents; and 
(d) other factors the court considers necessary and relevant. 
(5) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, upon the relocation, as defined in 
Subsection (1), of one of the parties the following schedule shall be the 
minimum requirements for parent-time with a school-age child: 
(7) The custodial parent is entitled to all parent-t^me not specifically 
allocated to the noncustodial parent. 
(6) (8) In the event finances and distance preclude the Exercise of minimum 
parent-time for the noncustodial parent during the school year, the court 
should consider awarding more time for the noncustodial parent during the 
summer time if it is in the best interests of the children. 
(7) (9) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order uninterrupted 
parent-time with the noncustodial parent for a minimum of 30 days during 
extended parent-time, unless the court finds it is not ill the best interests of 
the child. If the court orders uninterrupted parent-time during a period not 
covered by this section, it shall specify in its order which parent is 
responsible for the child's travel expenses. 
(&) (10) Unless otherwise ordered by the court the relocating party shall be 
responsible for all the child's travel expenses relating jo Subsections (5)(a) 
and (b) and 1/2 of the child's travel expenses relating to Subsection (5)(c), 
provided the noncustodial parent is current on all support obligations. If the 
noncustodial parent has been found in contempt for not being current on all 
support obligations, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for all of 
the child's travel expenses under Subsection (5), unless the court rules 
otherwise. Reimbursement by either responsible party 
child's travel expenses shall be made within 30 
documents detailing those expenses. 
(9) (11) The court may apply this provision to any preexisting decree of 
divorce. I 
(W) (12) Any action under this section may be set for an expedited hearing. 
(44) (13) A parent who fails to comply with the notice of relocation in 
Subsection (2) shall be in contempt of the court's order 
Although UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-37 does apply, the court fallowed that guideline in its 
determination that a change of circumstances had occurred. 
guidelines in determining parent-time as well as giving it authority to "make appropriate 
to the other for the 
days of receipt of 
This statute gives the court 
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orders regarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time transportation" as well as 
allowing the court to consider factors necessary and relevant (including the economic 
resources of both parents) when determining parent-time. As the court was considering 
all the factors to determine parent-time, several issues were brought to light and it 
became apparent that a change of circumstances had occurred, which resulted in the need 
to award sole custody to Child. The change of circumstances was not based solely on 
Globis' relocation to Salt Lake. It was also based on her inability to hold a job, unstable 
housing arrangements, immaturity, etc. Thus, even if the original custody order 
addressed contemplated moves by the parties, such statement was made in general terms 
rather than addressing a specific contemplated move at the time. Additionally, the court 
still would have found that there had been a change of circumstances on the other factors. 
Therefore, Globis argument is thus flawed. 
Thus, based upon Globis' unstable employment and housing and her relocation to 
Salt Lake City, which considerably changed the joint custody arrangement of the parties, 
a substantial change in circumstances did occur and the trial court's award of custody to 
Child was warranted. While Globis argues throughout her brief that she is no less of a 
parent to Ariann because she has moved to Salt Lake City, Globis' relocation, together 
with her failure to obtain stable employment and housing has led to a substantial change 
of circumstances in this matter. Brief of Appellant beginning at p. 22. First, Globis' 
move to Salt Lake City significantly affected the joint custody arrangement the parties 
had been exercising, rendering it nonfunctional and thus causing a substantial change in 
material circumstances. Moody at 509. 
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Furthermore the fact that Globis had not held a job and had bounced around from 
house to house since her relocation shows that leaving the chi 
best interests of the child since Globis was failing to provide a stable environment in 
which to reside with Ariann. The trial court found that, based upon the circumstances, it 
was clearly in Ariann's best interests to be placed in the soli custody of Child since he 
maintained the housing and employment necessary to provide her with a stable 
environment. Globis further provided instability for Ariann having gone from job to job 
since her move, which was clearly not in the best interests of Ariann. Thus, the trial court 
decided that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred based upon Globis' 
move and instability and thus awarded sole custody to Child. A substantial change in 
circumstances had occurred and therefore, the trial court's decision was correct. 
II. CHANGE OF CUSTODY FROM JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY TO 
SOLE LEGAL CUSTODY WAS IN THE CHILD'S BEST 
INTERESTS. 
Several factors are considered in a determination as to whether a custody change is 
d in her care was not in the 
in the best interest of a particular child. Under Tucker v. Tucker, the Utah Supreme 
Court indicated the following factors pertaining to the child's feelings and needs: 
...the preference of the child; keeping siblings together;! the relative strength 
of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians; and, in 
appropriate cases, the general interest in continuing previously determined 
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted. 
Ibid., 910 P.2d 1209, 1215 (Utah l996)(quoting Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 
(Utah 1982). Tucker further sets forth factors to be examined respecting the parents' 
character and capacity, as follows: 
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• . .moral character and emotional stability; duration and depth of desire for 
custody; ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care; significant 
impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, excessive 
drinking, or other cause; reasons for having relinquished custody in the 
past; religious compatibility with the child; kinship, including, in 
extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status; and financial condition. 
Id., citing Hutchison at 41. It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court's 
holdings in Tucker mimic those outlined in UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R4-903(5) as it 
pertains to uniformity in custody evaluations. 
This Court more recently addressed how factors pertaining to a change in custody 
based on a material change in circumstances should be weighed, as follows: 
Although the court considers many factors, each is not on equal footing. 
Generally, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine, based on the 
facts before it and within the confines set by the appellate courts, where a 
particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative importance and to 
accord each factor its appropriate weight. 
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, TJ26, 989 P.2d 491; see, Davis v. Davis, 749 
P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988); Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah App 1998), cert 
denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). This Court pointed out that the myriad of factors in 
such a determination range from "possibly relevant to the critically important," noting 
that continuity of placement is considered critically important "when a child is thriving, 
happy, and well-adjusted." Id. 
However, not all continuity is alike. A heavy emphasis on preserving 
stability presupposes that the prior arrangement is not only satisfactory, but 
will in fact continue. As the trial court recognized in this case, there are 
variations in the degree of continuity that can be afforded. When 
maintaining one parent's primary physical custody will not truly 
preserve stability and continuity in the child's life, the court may find 
less compelling circumstance are sufficient to modify the custody 
order. In this case, Hudema diminished the extent of possible continuity, 
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and thus the weight properly to be accorded this factojr, when she changed 
the interpersonal dynamics of her household by remarrying and by moving 
from Jackson's lifelong Layton home to a new home in another state. See 
Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 723 n. 4 (Utah d.App.l994)("To an 
extent, of course, uprooting children from their present schools and 
neighborhood and moving them to a different state is inimical to continuity 
in their lives."). 
Id. at f27 (emphasis added). This Court concluded in Hudema that modification was 
based on sufficient change of circumstances and that, ". . .continuing Hudema's custody 
would do less to preserve overall stability in Jackson's life thaii is usual." Id. at }^44. 
In the Decision in the instant matter, the trial court ffound that Child either had 
custody or cared for Ariann approximately forty percent (4Q%) of the time. It further 
found that Globis was a failure at managing money, had sqikandered her inheritance of 
almost $150,000, owed several people money in relation to housing, was an unreliable 
witness, and that the court was not optimistic that she woula ever be able to focus and 
hold down a job to provide a stable and secure home for Ariann. R0472-474. The trial 
court indicated that Child was able to manage his finances e|en though his income was 
irregular, and the trial court believed Child could provide a ^ecure and stable home for 
Ariann. R0474-475. 
The trial court found that both parents had been heavily involved in Ariann's life 
and that her interests were best served by having ongoing involvement with both parents. 
R0476-477, R0482. The trial court indicated that it considered numerous factors in 
determining custody and parent time including: past conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each parent; which parent will act in the child's best interests; bonding 
between parent and child; and maturity of parents. R0481. ^he trial court believed that 
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Child was better situated to provide for Ariann and accordingly awarded custody to 
Child. R0182. 
Clearly the trial court in this matter took into consideration the factors set forth in 
Tucker, supra, weighing each factor appropriately in accordance with the spectrum set 
forth in Hudema, supra, from "possibly relevant to the critically important." While 
continuity of placement with Globis would have typically been weighed as "critically 
important," such presumption was rebutted by the fact that Globis evidenced an inability 
to maintain stability for either herself or Ariann based on her sporadic employment 
history and inability to provide financially for her or Ariann's needs. When combined 
with the fact that Globis uprooted Ariann from the area in which her father lived— 
someone Ariann spent forty percent (40%) of her day-to-day life with—it is clear that the 
determination of best interests in this matter was correctly rendered by the trial court's 
grant of custody to Child. See, Hudema, supra. 
In Hudema, supra, this Court opined that the presumption that continuity of 
placement was in the child's best interest was rebutted by the relocation of the parent 
away from other kinship and family members, noting later in its decision that Hudema 
somewhat minimized the negative impact on the child by only relocating from one 
location to another rather than several. In the instant matter, Globis has relocated several 
times and owes several individuals money in relation to housing. Further, Globis' 
financial circumstances are exacerbated by the fact that she is unable to maintain 
employment, the court itself indicating that it was not optimistic that she would ever be 
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able to focus and hold down a job to provide a stable and secure home for Ariann. 
R0472-474. 
tody will not truly preserve "When maintaining one parent's primary physical cust 
stability and continuity in the child's life, the court rbay find less compelling 
circumstance are sufficient to modify the custody order." Huilema at T|27. Globis argues 
that Ariann was happy in her placement with Globis and that| no evidence supported the 
need for a change of custody; however, this ignores h^r own responsibilities in 
maintaining the stability and continuity by obtaining employment and stable housing for 
herself and Ariann. The circumstances in which Globis uprooted Ariann to Salt Lake 
City from Moab, away from the secondary caretaker who mjaintained custody and care 
for approximately forty percent (40%) of the time weighed in I favor of change of custody 
to "truly preserve stability and continuity in the child's life." 
Further, the trial court determined that Globis was an l unreliable witness. In the 
Brief of Appellant, Globis argues that the trial court reopened the issue of her 
untruthfulness regarding Ariann be dismissed from the Montessori preschool due to 
Globis' failure to pay her one half of the tuition. Brief of Appellant at p. 45. Letters from 
the preschool were submitted to the trial court indicating thai] Ariann was dismissed for 
lack of payment. However, Globis previously testified that Ariann could still attend even 
though she had not paid in full. Although Child did request that the court reconsider 
testimony on this issue that was given at the hearing in February of 2009, the trial court 
Although Child objects to the use of any non-certified transcripts in the briefing in this matter, as argued further 
below, Globis' own inappropriate references cited to in her brief evidence her reliance on Child for money to 
maintain stability for Ariann, with Child having paid over $5000 ahead in child support and another $2000 for 
Globis to obtain a safe car to transport their daughter. 
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denied Child's request to reopen it. See Findings of Fact at p. 7. 
Both parents have been heavily involved in Ariann's life and the trial court 
determined that it was in her best interests to grant sole custody to the parent who 
evidenced a sincere desire for custody and who clearly desired to take on the 
responsibilities of ensuring that Ariann's physical and emotional needs were all met. The 
trial court believed Child could provide the secure and stable home for Ariann that had 
been absent with Globis's exercise of custody. R0474-475. This Court should affirm the 
trial court's determination that it was in Ariann's best interests to have sole legal custody 
granted to Child. 
III. GLOBIS IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
"It is the general rule that pro se litigants should not recover attorney fees for 
successful litigation." See, e.g., Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 354 F.Supp. 310, 311 
(N.D.Cal.1973); O'Neil v. Schuckardt 112 Idaho 472, 480, 733 P.2d 693, 706 (1986). Cf 
Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Juneau v. Bernhardt, 794 P.2d 579, 581-82 (Alaska 
1990); O'Neil v. Lumber Co. v. Nickelodeon Cos., 190 Mont. 25, 28, 617 P.2d 1291, 
1293(1980). Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 473, (Utah,!992). Furthermore, "[i]n 
civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the 
court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith...." In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, |45, 86 
P.3d 712. "A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the 
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award." UT. R. APP. P. 
24(a)(9). "We have consistently declined to review issues that are not adequately 
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briefed." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Common (In re Questar Gas Cf), 2007 UT 79, ^ 40, 175 
P.3d 545. 
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside 
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, TJ14, 48 P.3d 968. To determine 
whether the trial court had such an opportunity, we consider three factors: "(1) the issue 
must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a 
party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal aut 
2010 UT App 106, ^fl3. When an appellant fails to preserve ^n issue below and does not 
argue that plain error or exceptional circumstances exist to jus 
Court has declined to consider it on appeal. State v. Pledger 
hority." Id. State v. Maese 
ify review of an issue, this 
896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. 5 
(Utah 1995). 
"[A]n appellate court plays a 'limited role' in reviewing a district court's award of 
attorneys' fees and costs, and deference is given to a district court's judgment on the 
matter, since the court is in a better position to assess the course of litigation and quality." 
Harris Mkt. Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Communications, Inc^ 948 F.2d 1518, 1527 
(10th Cir.1991). See Gamble, Simmons & Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 175 F.3d 762 
(C.A.10 (Okla.) 1999). When a notice of appeal concerning! an issue is untimely, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of it. See, e.g., Serrato v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 2000 UT App 299, If 7, 13 P.3d 616. 
In the instant matter, Globis is seeking "an award of all of Appellant's fees and 
costs incurred in defending Appellant from Appellees' [sic] initial Verified Petition for 
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Paternity, Custody, and Related Matters that has now escalated to Appellant's appeal." 
Globis is not entitled to fees and costs for several reasons. First, the time allowed for 
Globis to seek attorney fees for the initial paternity petition is past. Even if the time 
allowed was not past, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Order from 
the initial paternity petition proceedings all specifically states that each party will pay his 
or her own attorney's fees and court costs, only allowing for any further costs and 
attorney fees incurred in enforcing the terms of the judgment should one party violate it.5 
R0009, R0132, R0139-140. Thus, Globis is not entitled to attorneys fees because Child 
did not fail to perform his obligation, but only sought on meritorious grounds to modify 
the original grant of joint custody. 
The paternity petition action is also not at issue in this appeal as Globis claims, 
and thus she is not entitled to attorney's fees for that action. The modification is a 
separate and distinct action from the initial paternity petition. The modification is not 
connected with the paternity petition action. Globis appealed only from the modification 
proceeding, not the initial paternity proceeding. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
address the issue. See, Serrato, supra. 
Globis is likewise not entitled to attorney's fees as a result of the modification 
since no attorney's fees were requested or awarded during the proceedings below and 
thus such issue was not properly preserved for appeal. Maese at TJ13. Accordingly, this 
Court should decline to reach the merits of such argument. Pledger, supra. Globis was 
5
 Child paid one of Globis' counsel $2,000 in fees and then was to be repaid by Globis. Child has never been repaid 
by Globis an such issue was never further discussed by the trial court. 
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also not the prevailing party in the modification proceeding! and thus, is not entitled to 
attorney's fees. Sonnenreich at ^45. Globis is also representjing herself on appeal and is 
not entitled to any attorney's fees on appeal. Batchelor at 473,. 
Finally, Globis is in violation of UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)j(9) as she has not properly 
briefed her request for attorney's fees and costs. Globis has not explicitly set forth the 
legal basis for such award and thus has not properly briefed such claim. Since Globis did 
not preserve the issue of attorney's fees and is now representing herself, the modification 
was a separate action from the paternity action, and the modification is the action which 
has led to this appeal, Globis is not entitled to any of the requested attorney's fees and 
this Court should decline to address the issue. 
IV. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO FOLLOW PROPER BRIEFING 
REQUIREMENTS, THUS THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
A. Globis' Brief Does Not Conform With UT. j . APR P. 24(a) 
UT. R. APP P. 24(a) mandates that all briefs shall contain the following pertinent 
parts: 
(a)(4) A statement of the issues presented for review,] including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and (a) 
(5) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an | issue not preserved 
in the trial court. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain tl^ e contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and| set forth the legal 
basis for such an award. 
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(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
In State v. Lucero, this Court determined the following with regards to the failure to brief 
as set forth in UT. R. APP P. 24: 
Defendant's appellate brief failed to comply with the rules of appellate 
procedure, and thus the Court of Appeals was not required to address 
defendant's appellate arguments, where defendant failed to cite where in 
the record issues were preserved for review, he failed to set forth the proper 
standard of review, and his argument section failed to include any relevant 
citations, authority, or legal analysis that would support his allegations. 
Ibid, 2002 UT App 135 TflO 47 P.3d 107. This Court farther stated, "[w]hen considering 
arguments on appeal, we look to the requirements of Rule 24 to determine whether an 
appellant adequately briefed the issue." Id. at ^|9. Rule 24 requires "[a] statement of the 
issues presented for review, including for each issue; [t]he standard of appellate review 
with supporting authority; and a citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court." Id. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not 
address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Burns v. Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197, 199-200 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996)(citing cases where this court has declined to reach merits of claims because 
appellants' briefs failed to comply with Rule 24.) "This court noted that the requirements 
of the rule [24] serve to "focus the briefs, thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency in 
the processing of appeals." Christensen v. Munns 812 P. 2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(specifically referring to standard of review requirement). 
In the instant matter, Globis filed an Amended Brief on February 8, 2010, and 
indicated that such Brief was in compliance with UT. R. APP. P. 24(a). However, the 
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Brief does not conform to Rule 24. First, Globis is not in compliance with UT. R. APR P. 
24 (a)(5). While she has set forth the issues she wishes to nave reviewed, she has not 
cited the appropriate appellate review or supporting authority In fact, it does not appear 
that she even briefed the issues set forth in the argument sectipn. Globis appears to have 
intended to argue the issues of (1) whether a substantial change of circumstances has 
occurred, (2) whether the trial court erred by not applying statutory procedure when it 
terminated the joint custody arrangement, (3) whether the trial court violated her due 
process rights by not equitably using the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of 
Evidence between the parties, (4) whether the trial court erred in finding she should bear 
the cost of transportation for parent time, and (5) whether she was entitled to attorney's 
fees on appeal. However, not only does she cite no standard of review or supporting 
authority for these issues, she fails to present them or adequately present them under the 
argument section of her brief. Her failure to present the standard of review and 
supportive authority for the issues in her brief is a violation of JUT. R. APP P.24 (a)(5) and 
thus should not be reviewed by this Court. 
Next, Globis is in violation of UT. R. APP P. 24(a)(9) afe she has failed to present 
and argument that has supportive authority or that relates to the issues presented. While 
she sets forth a section entitled case law at the beginning of her brief, no case law is 
present in the argument section of her brief to show how her argument is supported. Brief 
of Appellant at p. xxviii. In fact, the majority of Globis' argument is colloquies from the 
trial regarding her housing and financial issues that have not been transcribed, although 
she "swears" such colloquies are true and correct this Court is wlithout transcripts to know 
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if such colloquies are accurate depictions of what occurred at the trial in this matter. 
Furthermore, she either does not address the issues set forth in her brief or fails to 
adequately address them. She has also cited no supportive authority for her argument as 
set forth in her brief. This is a direct violation of UT. R. APP P. 24(a)(9) and therefore, 
this Court should decline to hear such arguments. 
Finally, Globis has violated UT. R. APP P. 24(a)(10) in that her conclusion is not 
short and concise and does not cite the precise relief sought. Instead it is five and a half 
(5 l/i) pages of how the trial court erred and why it is in the best interest of the child to 
remain with her. This section would have more appropriately fit in the argument section 
of the brief and as it is not a precise, short, and concise version of the relief sought, this 
court should not review it. 
This court has noted that the requirements of the rule [24] serve to "focus the 
briefs thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency in the processing of appeals." 
Christensen at 69. Globis' brief fails to conform with the UT. R. APP P. 24(a)(4), (5), (9), 
and (10) and thus such brief should be stricken in its entirety and not reviewed by this 
Court. 
B. Globis Has Failed to Provide Certified Transcripts or Marshal 
the Evidence, Both Requisite to a Challenge to Any Findings by 
the District Court 
UT. R. APR P 24(a)(9) in pertinent part states, "[a] party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." 
"Appellants cannot discharge their duty to marshal all evidence supporting challenged 
factual finding by simply providing an exhaustive review of all evidence presented at 
32 
trial." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Nltountain Fonds 2006 UT 
35, 140 P.3d 1200. "In order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly 
erroneous, "[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence." Cnen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 
82 f 19, 100 P.3d 1177, (Utah, 2004.), citinz In re Estate of Bkrtell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1989) (internal quotations omitted). In Horton v. Gemj State Mut. of Utah, this 
Court stated as follows: 
Because Gem State has failed to provide us with la transcript of the 
proceedings, we are unable to review the evidence and^ thus, are unable to 
ascertain whether the trial court's findings were based upon sufficient 
evidence. Absent the trial transcript, appellant's claim ojf error is ^merely an 
unsupported, unilateral allegation which we cannot resdlve." Mark VII Fin. 
Consultants Co.,[v. Smedley] 792 P.2d [130,] 134 [(UT. Ct. App. 1990)]. 
Without all the relevant evidence bearing on the issues raised on appeal, as 
required by Utah R.App.P. 11(e)(2), "we can only presume that the 
judgment was supported by sufficient evidence." State\ v. Nine Thousand 
One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213, 217 ( 
However, even aside from not including the transcript 
Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
in the record, Gem 
State still failed to meet its obligation to marshal] the evidence by 
persistently arguing its own position without regard for the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, and failing to demonstrate that the 
findings were against the clear weight of the evidence and, thus, clearly 
erroneous. 
Ibid., 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1990). In Mark VII Fin. Consultants Corp. v. 
Smedley, this Court discussed Appellant's burden to provide thjis Court with an adequate 
record on appeal as follows: 
[Insurer's failure to provide Court of Appeals ^ith transcript of 
proceedings rendered Court unable to review evidence and thus unable to 
ascertain whether trial court's findings were based upon sufficient 
evidence, and insurer failed to meets its obligation to jnarshal evidence. 
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Appellant has burden of providing Court of Appeals with adequate record 
to preserve its arguments for review, and must also marshal all evidence 
that supports findings and demonstrates that, despite such evidence, 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against clear weight of evidence 
and thus clearly erroneous. RULE APP. PROC. RULE 11(e)(2). The Appellant 
has the burden of providing us with an adequate record to preserve its 
arguments for review. 
Ibid., 792 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
UT. R. APP. P. 11(e)(2) states, "[t]ranscript required of all evidence regarding 
challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding 
or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include 
in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither 
the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the 
relevant portions of the transcript." In In re Estate of Bartell, it was noted by the Utah 
Supreme Court that marshaling is required on challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence because, it is "reflective of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on 
disputed facts." Ibid., 116 P.2d. 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
In the instant matter, Globis failed to provide the Court with transcripts from the 
trial court hearings, having been denied a payment arrangement by the transcriber and 
denied submission by this Court of an uncertified copy she personally prepared. In 
Horton this Court determined that, without transcripts, this Court is unable to review the 
evidence and "ascertain whether the trial court's findings were based upon sufficient 
evidence." No transcripts have been made part of the record on appeal in this matter, and 
in her brief Globis has relied solely on colloquy from the trial court hearings dealing with 
her financial issues and lack of money, her lack of employment, her credibility as a 
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witness, and her relationship with Ariann, attempting to use! such colloquy to show that 
no substantial change in circumstances exists to warrant a change in custody. However, 
Globis' failure to provide transcripts further emphasizes that jhis Court has no choice but 
to presume the regularity of the proceedings below. Globis iswears" that the colloquies 
upon which she relies in her brief are "word for word." Brief of Appellant at p. 21. 
However, as this Court has not reviewed the hearings and has no transcripts before it to 
review, it is impossible to know if the colloquies are word for word as Globis claims. 
Globis has not and clearly cannot meet the marshaling] requirement respecting all 
the necessary evidence in this matter. While she has the pleadings located in the record 
upon which she could rely, these pleadings constitute only a minute amount of the 
evidence that was presented, excluding all testimony from the hearings upon which the 
trial court relied in rendering its decision. Globis is "unable to marshal all evidence 
supporting challenged factual finding by simply providing an exhaustive review of all 
evidence presented at trial." Without such evidence, this Court cannot determine whether 
the trial court made an erroneous decision in its finding tha^ : a substantial change in 
circumstances existed. 
Globis failed to marshal the evidence, failed to present the transcripts relating to 
such evidence, failed to provide standard of review for her issues, failed to provide any 
legal authority or citations for her argument, and failed to enter a short, concise, precise 
conclusion. UT. R. APP. P. 24(a). Having been provided substantial opportunity by this 
Court to correct these issues, Globis' Brief should thus be strickejn. 
CONCLUSION 
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WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this 
Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the trial court in this matter. 
DATED this day of , 2010. 
Craig C. Halls 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Addendum -A-
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
Attorney for Petitioner 
333 South State Street 
Blanding, Utah 84511 
Telephone: (435)678-3333 
Facsimile: (435)678-3330 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
RLED
 APR Z 7 2039 
CUERK OF THE COURT 
BYm Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE O^ UTAH 
GREG CHILD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RENEE GLOBIS, 
ORDER RE: PETITION TO 
MODIFY ORDER 
Civil too. 0547-3 
Judge jLyle R. Anderson 
Respondent. 
Pursuant to the Memorandum Decision entered in this matter 
on April 7f 2009, and pursuant to the Findings of Fact entered 
herewith, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The joint legal custody of the partids and primary 
physical custody of the Respondent as to the minor child, Ariann, 
is hereby terminated pursuant to U.C.A,§30-3-10, 
2. Sole legal and physical custody of the 
Ariann, is hereby awarded to Petitioner, Greg piild pursuant to 
U.C-A. §30-3-10. 
.4(3). 
minor child, 
ORDER RE: PETITION TO MODIFY ORDER 
VD286S7123 pages. 3 
054700003 GLOBIS.RENEE 
00055C 
3. Respondent is entitled to liberal parent time with 
Ariann. If the parties are unable to negotiate a liberal parent 
time schedule, the relocation statute found at §30-3-37 shall be 
imposed if Respondent lives more than 150 miles from the child's 
domicile in Moab, Utah; the statutory schedule found at S30-3-35 
shall apply if the parties live closer than 150 miles apart. 
This order may be supplemented with an order that deals with the 
visitation at such time as the parties can ag^ee and submit a 
stipulated schedule to the court. 
4. Respondent is obligated to pay child support at such 
time as she establishes gainful employment in accordance with the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines, The Court reserves the issue 
of child support until Respondent has steady employment. 
5. The parties are ordered to provide medical, dental and 
optical insurance for the minor child if available through 
employment at a reasonable cost and each shall pay one-half of 
all out-of-pocket expenses, including co-pays, deductibles and 
premiums. The party incurring the expense shall notify the other 
within 30 days of an obligation being incurred. Petitioner 
currently carries such insurance and is entitled to a 
contribution for one-half of such costs by Respondent. 
000551 
6. Respondent shall be responsible for payment of one-half 
of any work-related day care costs incurred by Petitioner. 
Notice of such obligation shall be sent within 30 days of 
incurring the expense. 
7. Costs of visitation with the child sihall be born by 
Respondent• 
8. Respondent is ordered to execute anyl document and co-
operate in any way requested in the obtaining of a passport or 
any other travel document to allow Ariann to gravel out of the 
United States* 
9* The remaining provisions of the August, 2007, order 
shall remain in full force and effect. 
DATED t h i s l^ffL day o f A p r i l , 2 0 0 9 . 
BY THE COUR^: 
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